Defining Verbal Behavior: Two Approaches That May Not Be in Conflict

Behavior analysts often debate whether Skinner’s definition of verbal behavior or relational frame theory’s definition is “correct.” This paper argues the debate may be misframed—these definitions serve different purposes and don’t have to compete. For clinicians, understanding this distinction can reduce confusion in treatment planning and help teams focus on what actually matters: building meaningful communication skills.

What is the research question being asked and why does it matter?

This paper asks a straightforward question: What counts as “verbal behavior,” and must we choose between Skinner’s definition and relational frame theory’s definition?

Skinner defined verbal behavior by how reinforcement is delivered—through other people who have been trained to reinforce the speaker. RFT defines it as relating events to each other in flexible, derived ways (like same as, different from, more than, opposite).

This matters because clinicians, supervisors, and researchers use these terms to decide what to assess and teach. If the field uses the same label to mean different things, teams talk past each other, write unclear goals, and argue about “what’s really verbal” instead of helping the learner.

It also matters for dignity. If you treat some early communication as “not really verbal,” you might delay teaching functional skills that families and learners need now.

The author argues this fight is partly a word problem. Skinner was describing how people commonly use the term “verbal behavior.” RFT was pushing the field toward a different way of talking about language to guide research in a certain direction. If these definitions are doing different jobs, they may not truly compete the way people assume.

What did the researchers do to answer that question?

This is a discussion paper, not a new experiment. The author compares the two definitions and sorts them into different types.

He reviews four types of definitions:

• Real definitions (about what something truly is)
• Lexical definitions (about common word use)
• Stipulative definitions (a proposed new meaning)
• Persuasive definitions (a proposed meaning presented as if it were the “real” or “common” meaning)

He argues Skinner’s definition works like a lexical definition—an attempt to match everyday use of “verbal behavior.” He argues RFT’s definition works more like a persuasive definition—an attempt to get the field to use the term in a new way, even though it can sound like a factual statement about what verbal behavior “is.”

The paper then reviews three common objections RFT writers have made about Skinner’s definition: that it blocked language research, that it is not “functional,” and that it is too broad (it would label lots of animal lab behavior as “verbal”). The author summarizes published counterarguments and adds his own.

He concludes that the two definitions are not in direct conflict. Skinner’s definition can still stand even if RFT adds useful details about complex language.

How you can use this in your day-to-day clinical practice

If your team uses both Skinner-based verbal behavior programs and RFT-based ideas, treat “verbal behavior” as a label that can serve more than one clinical purpose. Don’t assume a definition argument automatically changes what you should teach tomorrow.

Instead, ask a practical question: “What skill are we trying to build, and what controlling variables are we targeting?” This keeps you focused on function, not on winning a theory debate. It also helps you explain your plan to families without getting stuck in jargon.

Be precise in your documentation

When writing goals and programs, be clear about what you mean. If you write “mand,” specify what you’re teaching the learner to do, what signals will prompt it, and what the learner gets from it. If you write “derived relation” or “relational responding,” specify what relations you expect to emerge without direct teaching and how you’ll check.

Many clinical disagreements happen because two clinicians use the same word but mean different things. Define your terms in your own treatment documents so your whole team is on the same page.

Treat early communication as real communication

Keep directly taught communication as “real communication,” not a lesser category. RFT writers have sometimes argued that directly trained mands and tacts are not “truly verbal” in their system. The author pushes back: beginners still count as speakers, like beginner piano students still count as playing the piano.

Clinically, this supports a common-sense stance. If a learner can request, label, answer, or follow directions in ways that work for them and improve their quality of life, treat that as meaningful progress. Don’t delay functional communication training because of a theory-based label.

Watch for rigidity and build flexibility

At the same time, don’t stop at directly trained skills if your learner needs flexible language. The paper points out that RFT focuses on “derived” responding—where new responses show up after training, like understanding “Maria” in different question forms or learning that if A is more than B, then B is less than A.

Watch for rigidity. If a learner can only answer a question in one exact format, or only label with one exact stimulus and no generalization, you may need programming that builds flexibility across examples, contexts, and question forms. You can do this with multiple-exemplar training, careful generalization programming, and mixed practice—without claiming you’re “doing RFT” in a formal way.

Separate speaker and listener goals

Be cautious about overusing the idea that “the listener is verbal too” when it muddies treatment decisions. RFT often counts listening as verbal behavior, while other accounts treat listener behavior differently.

In practice, avoid confusion by writing separate goals for speaker skills (requests, labels, answering) and listener skills (following directions, selecting items, matching, responding to questions by pointing). This makes data clearer and helps you see split profiles—like strong listener skills with weak speaker skills, or the reverse.

Keep theoretical debates out of treatment plans

If someone on your team argues that Skinner’s definition is “too broad” because it would include nonhuman lab behavior, keep that debate out of the treatment plan unless it changes your procedures. Skinner already knew his definition could include animal studies when reinforcement is mediated by trained humans, and he didn’t see that as a problem.

The more relevant issue is whether your definition helps you choose better assessments and interventions for this learner. If it does, use it. If it doesn’t, adjust your language—but don’t pretend the definition itself is a treatment protocol.

Think about generalization early

If someone says Skinner’s definition is “nonfunctional” because it depends on the listener’s training history, translate that into a clinical question you can test: “Does the learner’s behavior contact reinforcement through a person who has learned to respond in a certain way?”

This matters for teaching because human communication often works because caregivers, teachers, and peers have learned how to respond to certain forms. Shape the environment by training caregivers and staff to reinforce communication in consistent, planned ways.

Plan for the opposite, too: if reinforcement depends on a highly trained listener (like an RBT), you may see skill loss in natural settings. Build generalization plans early, including caregiver practice and community practice.

Stay humble about what this paper tells us

Don’t claim that RFT’s definition replaces Skinner’s, or that it applies to all learners. This paper is a conceptual review, not outcome research. It doesn’t tell you that an RFT-based intervention will work better than a Skinner-based intervention for a given learner.

What it can do is help you stay humble about language labels and stay precise about what you’re actually teaching. If you want to add relational targets, do it because your learner needs more flexible language and because you can measure it clearly—not because of a definition dispute.

Protect learner dignity

Whether you call a response a “mand,” a “tact,” or “relational responding,” the ethical question is the same: does this skill increase choice, reduce frustration, and improve access to preferred and meaningful activities?

Use definitions as tools for clarity, not as reasons to dismiss a learner’s current communication or to push compliance-heavy goals that don’t benefit them.

Works Cited

Schoneberger, T. (2025). Defining verbal behavior: Two conflicting approaches. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 41, 117–149. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40616-025-00217-x